Course Description and Content:

This course examines American policy, strategy, and operational art during the middle part of the nineteenth century. During the first part of the course, we will look at the development of American grand strategy during the era of the early Republic, based on an understanding of America's place in the world, the genesis of the war with Mexico, the strategy and major campaigns of the Mexican War, and the way that Mexico prepared the generation of officers who led the armies of both the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War. During the second part, we will examine the strategy and campaigns of the Civil War. Throughout the course, it also treats civil-military relations in a republic as a major thread.

Learning Objectives:

Upon completion of the course, student will understand:

1. The origins of US policy and strategy during the era of the Early Republic.
2. Potential threats to the United States emanating from European powers and "derelict states" in North America.
3. The origins of the Texas War of Independence and its role in instigating the Mexican War.
4. The origins, policy and strategy, of the Mexican War
5. The major campaigns of the Mexican War and how they helped shaped the generation of officers who would lead the armies of both sides during the Civil War.
6. The status of US civil-military relations during the era of continental expansion and the Civil War.
7. The strengths and weaknesses of the political and military leadership of the Union and Confederacy.
8. The policy and strategy of the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War
9. Major campaigns of the Civil War and their impact on the war aims of both sides during the Civil War.

Requirements:

Students will submit a 15 page research paper/essay on an approved topic. The paper is due no later than two weeks after the end of the course.

Students auditing the course as a part of a Teaching American History Grant program must complete all readings, attend all of the seminars, and fully participate during the week.

Required Texts:

• William C. Davis, Lone Star Rising: The Revolutionary Birth of Texas (New York: Free Press, 2004) ISBN: 0-684-86510-6
• Richard M. McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) ISBN: 978-0807845691
• Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1994) ISBN: 978-0029215975
• Aaron Sheehan-Dean, Concise Historical Atlas of the US Civil War (New York: Oxford University press, 2009) ISBN: 978-0-19-530958-4
• Directed Readings: Photocopied Reading Packet (CP)

Sunday, June 21

4:30 pm - 6:00 pm: Session 1     Security Policy and Grand Strategy of the Early American Republic (Owens)

Focus: The very establishment of the American Republic constituted a threat to the legitimacy of monarchies and empires throughout the world, especially in Europe. In that respect, the United States was a "dangerous nation" from the very outset. Although far removed from Europe, the fledgling Republic remained vulnerable, a fact driven home by the War of 1812. The British maintained a strong base in Canada. The Spanish (later Mexico) held Florida and the territory west of the Mississippi south of the Louisiana Territory, which the United States had purchased from France in 1803. The policy and grand strategy of the Early Republic was designed to maintain a republican government in North America while avoided the prospect of "strategic encirclement" by the European powers.

Required Reading:

• The Federalist, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (CP pg 3)
• Richard Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Founders" (CP pg 18)
• Owens, "The Grand Strategy of the Early American Republic" (CP pg 52)

Recommended Reading:

• For the Common Defense, Chapter 4, "Preserving the New Republic's Independence"

7:30 pm - 9:00 pm: Session 2     Institute Lecture

Monday, June 22

9:00 am - 10:30 am: Session 3    Texas and Westward Expansion (Owens)

Focus: Long before the term "Manifest Destiny" was coined, Americans surged westward in search of land. That part of northern Mexico known as Texas was a particularly strong magnet. At first, the Norte Americanos were welcomed, first by Spain, and then by Mexico after its independence, because they provided a buffer against marauding Plains Indians. But there was always concern in Mexico City that the Texicans were a stalking horse for an expanding United States. Nonetheless, the Texas Revolution originated as part of a broader debate within Mexico about federalism. When the Republic of Texas gained its independence in 1836, it claimed the Rio Grande as its southwestern border, while Mexico insisted on the Nueces River as the boundary. When the United States annexed Texas in 1845, the border issue remained a bone of contention. This dispute provided the proximate spark that ignited the Mexican War.

Required Readings:

• Lone Star Rising, pp. 1-101

Recommended Readings

• Lone Star Rising, remainder of the book.

10:50 am - 12:20 pm: Session 4    Policy and Strategy of the Mexican War (Waghelstein)

Focus: The Mexican-American War resulted from a confluence of factors, trends, events and issues: Manifest Destiny, Texas' Annexation, weak and capricious Mexican governments, the Polk Administration's opportunism, Slave power's expansionist goals, the Missouri Compromise and the Monroe Doctrine. Acquiring Texas meant war — a disastrous one for Mexico. The net result of the war was the acquisition of California and New Mexico and a reopening of the slavery issue. The Compromise of 1850 would prove to be only a temporary fix.

The war centered around two major campaigns that penetrated deep into Mexico. In addition there were two peripheral campaigns that resulted in the capture of El Paso, Santa Fe and California. For the US, all four were successful. All required unprecedented movement of men and material and involved both Regulars and Volunteers. American naval power contributed to the success of the various campaigns. The war was the dress rehearsal for the West Point-trained junior officers prior to the real show that followed in 1861. The forces unleashed by the war would plunge both countries into civil war a decade and a half later.

Required Reading:

• For the Common Defense, Chapter 5, "The Armed Forces and National Expansion."
• Excerpt from Russell F. Weigley. History of the United States Army. Macmillan, New York.1967. (CP pg 66)
• Excerpt from Russell F. Weigley The American Way of War. Macmillan, New York. 1973. (CP pg 79)
• Excerpt from James M. McCaffrey. The Army of Manifest Destiny- The American Soldier in the Mexican War 1846-1848. NYU Press, New York. 1992. Chapter 9 (CP pg 83)
• Excerpt from Charles Reginald Shrader (ed) Reference Guide to United States Military History. 1815-1865. Facts on File, New York. 1993. (CP pg 99)

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm: Session 5    Taylor's Northern Campaign (Waghelstein)

Focus: Major military operations in Northern Mexico began when General Zachary Taylor ("Old Rough and Ready") was ordered to move his "Army of Observation" from his base at Corpus Christi into the disputed territory between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers. Once fired upon the war began in earnest. The northern campaign was marked by severe logistical problems, hard fighting on both sides with US artillery often being the deciding factor. In a series of engagements (Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Monterrey and Buena Vista) the Americans defeated superior Mexican forces. The north was also marked by increased political friction between Washington and Taylor. Operations eventually sputtered to a halt, the focus having shifted to Scott and Mexico City via Vera Cruz

Required Reading:

• K. Jack Bauer. The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York: MacMillan, 1974), Chaps. 3-6. (CP pg 118)
• John D. Waghelstein. "The Mexican War and the American Civil War: The American Army's Experience in Irregular Warfare as a Subset of a Major Conventional War" in Small Wars and Insurgencies. (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.139-142. (CP pg 192)
• Shrader (ed) Reference Guide to United States Military History. 1815-1865, pp. 64-67. (CP pg 196)

Tuesday, June 23

9:00 am - 10:30 am: Session 6    Scott's Southern Campaign (Waghelstein)

Focus: The decision to shift the main line of operations from Northern Mexico to the south was made primarily for military reasons. With the bulk of Taylor's regulars as well as volunteer units, Winfield Scott ("Old Fuss and Feathers") followed Cortez' invasion route from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. In a series of battles (Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, Chaputepec), Scott out-generaled Santa Anna and his outnumbered Americans out-fought the Mexican forces. Scott overcame forbidding terrain, critical supply issues, swarms of guerrillas, contentious subordinate generals and troop shortages to achieve victory. Santa Anna evacuated the capitol on September 14, 1847.

Lord Wellington said of Scott,"His campaign was unsurpassed in military annals. He is the greatest living soldier." Historian K. Jack Bauer wrote, "Nothing like the Mexico City Campaign exists in American military history for sheer audacity of concept except for MacArthur's Inchon-Seoul campaign of 1950."

Required Reading:

• John S.D. Eisenhower. Agent of Destiny, The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott (New York: Free Press, 1997), Chapters 22-27, (CP pg 201)
• Waghelstein. "The Mexican War … Irregular Warfare … ", pp 142-145. (CP pg 284)
• Shrader (ed) Reference Guide to United States Military History. 1815-1865, pp. 67-77. (CP pg 288)

10:50 am - 12:20 pm: Session 7    US Civil-Military Relations, 1815-1860 (Owens)

Focus: In essence, American civil-military relations have always constituted a bargain, the goal of which is to allocate prerogatives and responsibilities between the civilian leadership on the one hand and the military on the other. There are four questions that lie at the heart of civil-military relations: 1) who controls the military instrument? 2) What is the appropriate role of the military in a republic? 3) What degree of military influence is appropriate for a liberal society? What is the proper scope of military affairs? And 4) who serves?

The late Sam Huntington argued that military professionalism is the key to civilian control of the military. The bargain is that the military does not get involved in politics and the civilians acknowledge an autonomous military realm. This is the so-called normal theory of civil-military relations. But such a scheme has rarely prevailed in the American Republic, and did not prevail during either the Mexican War or the Civil War (on either side).

This session examines the civil-military bargain as it was negotiated during this period in light of domestic politics, technological change, and changes in the security environment.

Required Reading:

• Owens, "US Civil-Military Relations from the Early Republic to the Civil War." (CP pg 300)

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm: Session 8    Lincoln and Davis at War (Owens)

Focus: Based on their respective resumes, Jefferson Davis would seem to have the edge as a wartime president. He was a graduate of the US Military Academy, had distinguished himself in action during the Mexican War, had served as Secretary of War during the administration of Franklin Pierce, and had chaired the Senate committee on Military Affairs. Lincoln had, on the other hand, had served uneventfully as a captain of the Illinois militia during the short Black Hawk War. Indeed, during a speech he gave during his one term in Congress, Lincoln mocked his military experience.

Although he faced a steep learning curve, Lincoln generally performed effectively as a military leader. He was responsible for establishing the policy of the Union and for developing and implementing a strategy to achieve the goals of his policy. In doing so, he demonstrated flexibility and strategic acumen. He skillfully managed both his cabinet and his generals, and even Congress, where he had to maintain a working majority if the war was to be won. He did not hesitate to overrule his advisers, both military and civilian. Though the Union may have possessed a material edge over the Confederacy, resources do not organize themselves. Lincoln had to make the decisions that translated this advantage into military and political success.

Davis was not so successful. Much of the problem can be attributed to Davis' own prickly disposition. Despite beginning the war with a decided edge in talent in the right places, his irresolute leadership, predilection for engaging in personality clashes, and an approach that fluctuated between micro-management and inertia helped undermine the Confederacy's early advantages. Davis' shortcomings were magnified by a dysfunctional Confederate departmental system that undercut cooperation.

Required Readings:

• Owens, Abraham Lincoln: Leadership and Democratic Statesmanship During Wartime (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2009). (CP pg 316)
• Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Jefferson Davis's Generals, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) Chapters 4 & 5, pp. 65-103. (CP pg 358)

Wednesday, June 24

9:00 am - 10:30 am: Session 9    Union Military Leadership (Waghelstein)

Focus: Adding to Lincoln's burdens was the penchant of Federal officers for generating friction among themselves. Personal animosity, professional jealousy and battlefield incompetence often exacerbated the Union's early difficulties. While all three theaters of war witnessed these distractions, the Eastern Theater seems to have garnered the lion's share. Butler, McClellan, Pope, Banks, Burnside, Hooker and Meade and their subordinate commanders were often embroiled in controversy of one sort or another. The role of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War compounded the disharmony.

While the West and Trans-Mississippi Theaters were not immune, there appeared to be more cooperation than contention in these regions than in the East (possibly distance from the capitol was a factor). Cooperation in the West between the Army and the Navy (Grant and Porter) is particularly noteworthy. In the end it would be the winning combination of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas, all proven generals from the West that saved the Union. Once in place, these officers would see the war to its bloody conclusion with the Confederacy defeated.

Required Readings:

• Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command, The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), Chapter 6, pp. 163-189. (CP pg 380)
• Richard A. Sauers, Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2003), Chapter 3, pp. 49-66. (CP pg 408)

10:50 am - 12:20 pm: Session 10    Confederate Military Leadership (Waghelstein)

Focus: The South began the war with a decided edge, due in large part to Davis and Lee's ability to place known talent in key positions. Particularly effective was the Lee-Jackson relationship. But even the "Mighty Stonewall" was not immune as his volatile relationship with his able lieutenant, Ambrose Powell Hill demonstrated. Notable has been the post-Gettysburg blame-game that became the motif of Civil War historiography.

Possibly the most damaging environment was within the officer ranks of the western Army of Tennessee under Bragg and Hood. Confederate organizational snarls, personality clashes and irresolute leadership eventually undermined the Confederacy's early advantages.

Required Readings:

• Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command, The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), Chapter 2, pp. 7-49. (CP pg 419)
• William Garrett Piston, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History, Chapter 5, (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987), pp. 73-92. (CP pg 463)

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm: Session 11    Union Strategy (Owens)

Focus: Strategy is a plan of action for using available means to achieve the ends of policy. Within time and space, strategy does three things: it links ends and means, ensuring that there is not a mismatch between the two. Second, strategy helps to establish a priority among ends. Finally, strategy helps to conceptualize resources as means. In other words, it translates raw inputs such as men and money into the divisions and fleets that will be employed for the object of war. To carry out a strategy, one must have the right tactical instrument. Even the best-conceived strategy will fail unless it can rely on the right instrument to implement it.

A strategy can be judged according to a number of criteria. These include: 1) the adequacy of the strategy for achieving the end and its fit with the character of the war; 2) the degree to which it takes account of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and tactical, operational, logistical, and geographical constraints; 3) the appropriateness of the means to the achievement of the political objective; 4) the degree to which attainment of the military objective translates into the achievement of political objectives; 5) the degree to which the actual conduct of the war corresponds to the strategic conception at the beginning of the war; 6) the match between the strategy and social conditions, i.e., the degree to which the strategy fits the "genius" of the people; 7) the ability of the government to maintain public support for the war and the chosen strategy; 8) the ability of social and political factors to withstand the shock of war; and 9) the costs and risks of the chosen strategy compared to the outcome. Finally, we must always ask, were there better strategic alternatives than the one chosen?

Since the Union prevailed during the war, one can conclude that its strategy was successful. But was there a better strategy available? Could it have pursued a less costly strategic approach?

Required Readings:

• Owens, "Union Strategy." (Supplemental)

Thursday, June 25

9:00 am - 10:30 am: Session 12    Confederate Strategy (Owens)

Focus: Since the Confederacy lost the war, one can conclude that its strategy failed. Historians have argued that the South should have pursued a "Fabian" strategy, i.e. one that traded space for time. Others have contended that the Southern Confederacy should have chosen an "irregular' option based on guerrilla warfare. Yet others have claimed the Confederacy's main effort should have been made in the "Heartland," the vast region that lies between the Mississippi and the Appalachians.

Of course the shape of any strategy depends on the war aims of the political entity in question and the resources available. It also depends on geographical factors and the quality of the tactical instrument. The best strategy in the world cannot succeed without the correct tactical instrument. This session addresses this central question: was there a better strategy available to the Confederacy than the one it pursued or was the one it followed the best available? If the latter is true, what would have been necessary for the South to prevail?

Required Readings:

• McMurray, Two Great Rebel Armies
• Owens, "Confederate Strategy" (Supplemental)

10:50 am - 12:20 pm: Session 13    Limited War, 1861-62 (Waghelstein)

Focus: The American Civil War began with both sides assuming a short and limited war. It would not be. Both sides had an inflated opinion of their own military prowess. The disabusing process would be painful. Both sides suffered from an early case of "Last Battle Syndrome" believing that this war would be a repeat of the Mexican War experience. Simply capturing territory and cities would not be the deciding factors. It would take slaughter of an unimagined scale-Total War not Limited War. At the close of the first year Davis observed "Our maximum strength has been mobilized while the enemy is just beginning to put forth his might."

Required Readings:

• For the Common Defense, Chapter 6, "The Civil War 1861-1862" (pp.162-202).

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm: Session 14    War for the Heartland, 1862-63 (Owens)

Focus: There has been a growing consensus among Civil War historians that the key to Union victory lay in the Western Theater of operations (the Mississippi to the Appalachians). In early 1862, Union armies employed the Tennessee River as the "main line of operations" to penetrate deep into western Tennessee and northern Mississippi, turning Confederate defenses on the Mississippi River and in Kentucky. Grant's subsequent victory at Shiloh permitted Union forces to seize major parts of the Confederacy's one remaining east-west railroad line and opened the way to both Vicksburg on the Mississippi River and Chattanooga. The capture of Chattanooga permitted Union forces to penetrate the Appalachian barrier and seize Atlanta.

Required Readings:

• Owens, "Opening the Gateway to Victory: The 1862 Campaigns in the West" (CP pg 475)
• Owens, "Grant's Vicksburg Campaign" (CP pg 478)
• Owens, "From Stones River to Chattanooga" (CP pg 481)

Friday, June 26

9:00 am - 10:30 am: Session 15    War in the East, 1862-63 (Owens)

Focus: While the key to Union victory may have been the West, the Confederacy's best chance of success lay with Robert E. Lee in Virginia. His Army of Northern Virginia was the only successful Confederate Army. His elevation to command of that Army may well have changed the character of the war. By hammering Union forces from the Virginia Peninsula to Western Maryland in the summer and fall of 1862, Lee revived the hopes of a demoralized Confederacy. Had Lee not replaced Johnston after the latter was wounded at Seven Pines, Richmond very likely would have fallen to a siege. Under the circumstances, the seceded states may have been willing to reenter the Union under the old formula: "the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was," i.e. with slavery.

Instead, Lee took a mediocre army, replaced marginal generals with others who understood what he wanted, especially "Stonewall" Jackson and James Longstreet, and honed it into a peerless striking force. Lee and his army became the hope of the Confederacy; no matter reverses in the West, at Vicksburg, Chattanooga, or even Atlanta, Lee fueled Southern optimism.

Required Readings:

• Owens, "From Beaver Dam Creek to Antietam: Lee's Virginia-Maryland Campaign of 1862" (CP pg 486)
• Owens, "The Chancellorsville-Gettysburg Campaign" (CP pg 491)

10:50 am - 12:20 pm: Session 16    Atlanta to Durham Station (Waghelstein)

Focus: In the spring of 1864 five Federal Armies were in motion, implementing the plan that Lincoln had envisioned two years earlier. Of those five three failed to accomplish their objectives but they did force the Confederacy to meet each threat. During the Federal expedition up the Red River, for example, Banks' came close to loosing both an army and a navy.

Following the relief of besieged Chattanooga, Sherman pushed into the South's heartland and captured Atlanta in time to provide a boost for Lincoln's re-election. The "March to the Sea", one of the more audacious campaigns in military history, began the process, as Sherman put it, "to make Georgia howl" He presented Savannah to Lincoln as a Christmas present.

After abandoning Atlanta, Hood maneuvered through Alabama and into Tennessee and is bloodied at Franklin. While Sherman is cutting the heart out of Dixie, the once proud Army of Tennessee is finally destroyed by "Pap" Thomas at Nashville in December of 1864

In February of 1865, Sherman's army, now rested and refitted turned north to bring the war to where it all started - South Carolina. Two months later, the final drama was played out with Joe Johnston's surrender at Durham Station, NC.

Required Readings:

• Owens, "The Atlanta Campaign" (CP pg 502)
• Owens, "From Atlanta to Durham Station and Spring Hill to Nashville" (CP pg 506)

1:30 pm - 3:00 pm: Session 17    Wilderness to Appomattox (Waghelstein)

Focus: Grant, now commanding all the Federal armies, co-locates with Meade's Army of the Potomac. While Butler fails at Bermuda Hundred below Richmond and Sigel stumbles in The Valley, an eleven month long bloody minuet in death begins with Grant and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia locked in nearly constant combat. Federal casualties dwarf previous campaigns but unlike Lee, Grant can replace his losses and he was prepared, as he wired Lincoln, "… to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." It did and then some.

Lee must counter each of Grant's moves and is forced into a siege at Petersburg, reminiscent of WWI and trench warfare. Jubal Early's raid on Washington does not loosen Grant's grip nor does it seriously endanger the capitol. The siege results in the fall of both Petersburg and Richmond.

Lee's last desperate race to elude Grant and link up with Johnston ends when he is forced to surrender at Appomattox. Of particular importance is the influence of four years of guerrilla warfare on the surrender terms offered to Lee and Johnston

Required Readings:

• Owens, "The Virginia Overland Campaign of 1864: From the Wilderness to the Gates of Petersburg" (CP pg 513)
• Owens, "Petersburg to Appomattox" (CP pg 516)
• Waghelstein. "The Mexican War … Irregular Warfare…", pp 145 -163 (CP pg 520)