Syllabus for AHG 611: The American Way of War

Master of American History and Government

Ashland University

AHG 611:

The American Way of War

Sunday, June 22 to Friday, June 27, 2008

Instructors: Mackubin T. Owens and Brian M. Linn

Course Focus:

This course is an overview of US military history with a focus on how the nation thinks about, prepares for, and conducts warfare. As such it examines the interaction of the military, cultural, social, material, institutional, and international factors that have shaped the "American way of war." The course will address several main questions: 1) How has the American form of government shaped the way the United States fights its wars? 2) How have those responsible for the actual conduct of war, especially the military profession, thought about war as a phenomenon? 3) Has the intersection of these two questions produces a uniquely "American Way of War?"

This course will examine how the American conceptualization and practice of war have reflected the intertwined views of political leaders, military intellectuals, and military practitioners. We will start by looking at the way in which the American Revolution engendered the governmental and military institutions of the United States, the "architecture" that has shaped the American way of war ever since. America's Revolutionary generation understood that war was a fact of international life, and that the survival of the infant republic depended on developing and maintaining the potential to make war. Indeed, the unprecedented ability of the United States to wage war while still preserving liberty is the greatest legacy of the America's Revolutionary generation.

The American Civil War constituted the greatest test of the Founders' legacy and also constituted the transition to "modern war," which required the creation of a mass armies and the total mobilization of the nation's people and resources." But the United States has always faced the threat of "irregular warfare, from the frontier to the Philippines and the Caribbean. The cases we will examine demonstrate the degree to which those responsible for preparing the United States for war have been successful in balancing requirements across the spectrum of conflict.

Learning Objectives:

Students will understand the broad narrative of American military history and appreciate how the nation's military experience has shaped both its past and present.
Students will understand the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of the American way of war.
Students will understand the role of the armed forces in exercising national policies
Students will understand the relationship between civilian political authority and the armed forces
Students will understand both why and how the nation's wars have been conducted
Students will understand the differences in various types of conflict the nation has either planned for or fought, ranging from domestic insurgency to atomic warfare.
Students will understand how both civilians and military personnel have attempted to deduce lessons from the nation's wars, and how these lessons have sometimes been misapplied as guides for current policies
Students will understand the impact of military history on current national security policy.
Students will understand that the nation's military legacy is a contested field and that historians and defense analysts often disagree about the consequences of military actions

Course Requirements:

Students will submit a 15-20 page research paper/essay on an approved topic. The paper is due no later than two weeks after the end of the course.

Students auditing the course as a part of a Teaching American History Grant program must complete the readings and fully participate in the seminars during the week.

Required Texts:

Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States rev. exp. edition. New York: Free Press, 1994. ISBN: 978-0029215975
Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 2007. ISBN: 978-067402651
W. B. Allen, ed., George Washington: A Collection ISBN: 0865970599
Course Packet ("CP") of additional readings. This packet will be provided online and is a required text for this course.

Schedule

Sunday, June 22

4:30 - 6:00pm:
Session 1 – An "American Way of War?" (Professor Linn)
Focus:
Is war a phenomenon that is unchanged by time, technology, or nation? Do nations create a distinct culture of war? What criteria can serve to identify a way of war? Why has the American Way of War suddenly become such an important topic?
Required Readings:
Antulio Echevarria, Toward An American Way of War, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003) (CP p. 5)

Max Boot, The New American Way of War, Foreign Affairs (July-August 2003) (CP p. 43)

Linn, Echo of Battle, 1-9

For Further Research (Optional):
George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994)
Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
Peter Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, And Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005)
Charles Heller and William Stofft, America's First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986)
Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1991)
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973)
Russell F. Weigley, History of the U.S. Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984)

7:00 - 8:30pm:
Session 2 – Institute Lecture (Professor Linn)
Topic: The American Way of War: A Historical and Interpretive Approach

Monday, June 23

9:00 - 10:30am:
Session 3 – The American Revolution and the Genesis of the American Way of War (Professor Owens)
Focus:
The American Revolution was instrumental in shaping future US conceptions of conflict and establishing the precedents that continue to affect the three-way relationship among the government, the people, and the uniformed military. The American Revolution is of historical interest because the war of 1775-1783 brought the United States and its military into being. It is of strategic interest because it provides examples of three different types of war. It was a war within a war within a war: 1) an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the American people; 2) a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and a British army exploiting its advantages in joint operations whenever possible; and 3) a global maritime conflict among great powers that was fought in the English Channel, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and off the coast of North America. It is of interest to us in this course because it established the precedents for the American way of war.
When the United States declared its independence in July 1776, what was the likelihood that the Americans could win their struggle with Great Britain? What was the strategic purpose of the Declaration of Independence? Assuming that the American Revolution was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, how well suited were the strategies and operations of American and British commanders to the nature of the war? What strategic and operational lessons did George Washington learn from his successes and failures in 1776? Given the overwhelming British victories in New York and New Jersey in 1776, how was General Washington able to avoid catastrophic defeat and eventually win the war? The United States fought the War for Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did George Washington and the Congress manage these different coalitions? How important was it for future US civil-military relations that George Washington deferred to civil authority even in the face of incompetence and corruption? What was the character of Washington's relationship with his soldiers? Was American success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?
Required Readings:
The Declaration of Independence (Ashbrook booklet)

Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies, 22 March, 1775 (CP p. 53)

Owens, "General Washington and the Military Strategy of the Revolution" (CP p. 59)

Allen, ed., George Washington: A Collection, Selections 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 31, 34, 40, 46, 48, 51, 55, 56, 61, and 62

Recommended Readings:
Allen, ed., George Washington: A Collection, remainder of Chapters 1-4

For the Common Defense, Chapter 3, "The American Revolution"

For Further Research (Optional):
James Martin and Mark Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1982)

10:45am - 12:15pm:
Session 4 – The US Constitution and the American Way of War (Professor Owens)
Focus:
By providing "for the common defense," the US Constitution establishes the institutional framework for the American way of war. It does so by granting powers to the three branches of government, creating offices, assigning functions, and bestowing authority and responsibility on offices and institutions. Ultimately, the US Constitution seeks to preserve the liberties of the people while at the same time enabling the government to defend the nation from threats and enemies, both foreign and domestic.
When the framers of the Constitution arrived in Philadelphia in the spring of 1787, what national security challenges did they face? What real and potential enemies lay on the borders of the new Republic? What were the prospects for domestic turmoil? What impact had Shays' Rebellion had on the delegates to the convention? Was Henry Knox correct when he wrote to Washington that "our present federal government is indeed a name, a shadow, without power, or effect. We must either have a government, of the same materials, differently constructed, or we must have a government of events." How did the Constitution and the defense establishment that arose from it shape the American way of war? What impact does it have on civil-military relations?
Required Readings:
Articles of Confederation (CP p. 103)

Alexander Hamilton to James Duane 3 Sept, 1780 (CP p. 109)

Richard Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Founders" (CP p. 115)

Allen, ed., George Washington: A Collection, Selections 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 86, 90, 93

Excerpts from The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (CP p. 151)

John Yoo and James Ho, "Declare War,"
Mackubin Owens, "Army Clause,"
Mackubin Owens, "Navy Clause,"
David Forte and Mackubin Owens, "Military Regulations,"
Mackubin Owens, "Militia Clause,"
Mackubin Owens, "Organizing the Militia,"
John Yoo and James Ho, "Commander in Chief,"
David Forte, "Commander of Militia,"
Nelson Lund, "To Keep and Bear Arms,"

Recommended Readings:
Allen, ed., George Washington: A Collection, Remainder of chapters 5-7

For the Common Defense, Chapter 4, "Preserving the New Republic's Independence"

For Further Research (Optional):
Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975)

Karl Walling, Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999

Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982)

4:30 - 6:00pm:
Session 5 – The Civil War: The March Toward Total War (Professor Owens)
Focus:
The American Civil War was one of the three great conflicts of the mid-nineteenth century— along with the Crimean War and the Wars of German Unification— that seem to transform the character of armed conflict into "modern warfare," wars requiring the creation of a mass armies and the total mobilization of the nation's people and resources. But while there is a tendency to concentrate on the major battle of the Civil War, it must be remembered that this conflict was also a domestic rebellion. Indeed, its original name was the War of the Rebellion.
In what way did the American Civil War look back to the Napoleonic Wars? In what way did it look forward to the Great war of 1914-1918? What impact did such technological innovations as the rifled musket and artillery have on the combatants? What about the railroad and the telegraph? Was the American Civil War a "total war?" Why of why not? What role did irregular fighters, including guerrillas and partisans, play in the conflict? How effective were such fighters? What impact did they have on the overall outcome of the war?
Required Reading:
Mark Neely, "Was the Civil War a Total War?" (CP p. 181)

James McPherson, "From Limited to Total War" (CP p. 207)

Jones, "The European Inheritance" (CP p. 219)

Waghelstein, "The Mexican War and the American Civil War: The American Army' Experience in Irregular Warfare as a Sub-set of a Major Conventional Conflict" (CP p. 249)

Recommended Readings:
For the Common Defense, Chapters 6-7

For Further Research (Optional):
Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans (New York: Knopf, 1991)

Tuesday, June 24

9:00 - 10:30am:
Session 6 – The Civil War, The Constitution, and Civil-Military Relations (Professor Owens)
Focus:
The American Civil War constituted the greatest test of the Founders' most important legacy: the ability of the United States to wage war while still preserving liberty. No president in American history has faced a greater crisis than Abraham Lincoln confronted in 1861. Although sections of the country had threatened disunion many times in the past, the emergency had always passed as some compromise was found. But in 1861, Lincoln, faced a rebellion "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings."
What did Lincoln claim as the basis of his war power? Were the steps he took to suppress the rebellion constitutional? Why or why not? For instance, Lincoln claimed to be fighting a war that would lead to "a new birth of freedom," yet some claim he violated civil liberties on an unprecedented scale. How can a war for liberty be reconciled with such violations of civil liberties? Were the steps he took during the war constitutional? Why or why not? Was he ever a "dictator" as some historians claim? What was the strategic impact of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation? What was Lincoln's impact as a war leader and strategist? Given the disparities in resources between the North and the South, wasn't it a foregone conclusion that the North would triumph in a war of attrition? Compare his performance with that of Jefferson Davis. What are the problems of conducting a war in a democracy? How did Lincoln handle them?
Required Readings:
Owens, "Abraham Lincoln: Democratic Statesmanship in War" (CP p. 279)

Owens, Grant and Lee (CP p. 311)

For Further Research (Optional):
Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002)

10:45am - 12:15pm:
Session 7 – The Tyranny of Change: Small Wars/Industrial Wars (Professor Linn)
Focus:
Did American officers develop a distinct "way" of irregular warfare? Why did officers in the US military prepare for an "imagined" Great Power conflict while they were fighting irregular opponents? How did officers seek to overcome the challenges raised by the impact of technology, mass armies, and new methods of waging war? What prejudices and assumptions influenced military perceptions of war?
Required Readings:
For the Common Defense, 252-57, 265-80

Echo of Battle, 40-82

For Further Research (Optional):
Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig F�rster, eds., Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

Paul Hutton, ed., Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987)

Sherry Lynn Smith, The View From Officers' Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991)

Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1984)

Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995)

4:30 - 6:00pm:
Session 8 – The American Way of War–Insurgency: Philippines (Professor Linn)
Focus:
In 1898 the United States made a radical transition from isolationist continental power to a global empire. To some, the nation had finally become a Great Power. Both the reasons for the acquisition of empire and the methods the nation's military employed are a matter of great historical debate. In particular, the conquest of the Philippines and the suppression of indigenous resistance has aroused much controversy. Some have alleged American troops waged a genocidal campaign in the Philippines. Others have called this a model occupation and pacification campaign. Why were American forces so successful in the Philippines counterinsurgency campaign? What were some of the similarities and differences between the Philippines and earlier irregular wars? Why did the issue of troop conduct become so controversial? What lessons did American forces take from the counterinsurgency experience in the Philippines? A related question is the impact of these counterinsurgency operations on the Army. It is a common complaint that the US military forgets the lessons of unconventional wars and has to relearn them. But is that the US armed forces' primary duty? The imperial wars, particularly the Cuban campaign, revealed significant weaknesses in the mobilization, training, leadership, and organization of US military forces. As a result, the US embarked on a period of radical military reform that was credited with preparing it for World War I.
Required Readings:
For the Common Defense, 299-313

Echo of Battle, 89-92

John M. Gates, Indians and Insurrectos: The U.S. Army's Experience with Insurgency, (CP p. 319)

J. F. Bell to William Bisbee, 1900 (CP p. 331)

For Further Research (Optional):
Andrew J. Bacevich, "Disagreeable Work: Pacifying the Moros, 1903-1906," Military Review 40 (June 1982): 49-61

Andrew J. Bacevich, Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989)

Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998)

Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006)

Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000)

FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency(2006), Chapter 1 "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,"

Wednesday, June 25

9:00 - 10:30am:
Session 9 – Preparing for Great Power War: The Interwar Period (Professor Linn)
Focus:
The interwar era is often studied by analysts seeking lessons for how military institutions can adapt to the challenges of new technology, new doctrine, and new organizations. It witnessed the origins of some of the decisive methods of World War II: armored warfare; amphibious operations; strategic bombardment; and naval aviation. The Germans combined new technology (tanks, airplanes, motorized transport) with both new and traditional operational concepts and created blitzkrieg. The U.S. Navy and the Japanese began experiments with air craft carriers. The US Marine Corps created the concepts and technologies that would allow it to fight across the Central Pacific. In Great Britain and the United States officers developed a strategy of aerial bombardment that targeted enemy cities and populations. What intellectual biases and assumptions inhibited officers from responding to new challenges posed by technology? Did the technology revolutionize warfare? How did the armed forces incorporate the lessons of World War I in order to prepare for the next great conflict? The interwar period is often cited by today's defense commentators as a parallel for current military issues. What are some of the similarities and differences between the military issues of 1919-1939 and those of 2008?
Required Readings:
For the Common Defense, 381-407

Echo of Battle, 116-50

For Further Research (Optional):
Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998)

William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1999)

Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002)

Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

10:45am - 12:15pm:
Session 10 – Conducting Great Power War: WWII Europe (Professor Linn)
Focus:
For many Americans, World War II is the "Good War" fought by the "Greatest Generation." Yet there is very little understanding of the war itself. Recent academic emphasis on the Home Front and social change has unfortunately come at the cost of teaching about the conduct of the war. Among the public, the American campaign in the European Theater of Operations remains the subject of intense interest. Movies, books, and even video games all provide a mythic vision of the war. How did the United States mobilize to fight a global war against the Axis? How did political priorities shape military operations? Why did the war in the European Theater shape American perceptions of what war "should" be like? What factors influenced the American air-land-sea campaigns? What was the experience of the GI in Europe? Did commanders such as Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall represent "the greatest generation" in US military history?
Required Reading:
For the Common Defense, 413-486

For Further Research (Optional):
Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt, 2002)

Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944 (New York: Henry Holt, 2007)

Michael Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995)

Charles Macdonald, The Mighty Endeavor: The American War in Europe (New York: Da Capo, 1992)

Peter Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002)

Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)

George Wilson, If You Survive: From Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge to the End of World War II (New York: Ballantine, 1987)

4:30 - 6:00pm:
Session 11 – Great Power War: World War II in the Pacific (Professor Owens)
Focus:
The Pacific War was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It also demonstrated the American way of war at sea and the implementation of what Russell Weigley has called "the strategic tradition of A. T. Mahan."
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a serving naval officer and naval intellectual, was perhaps the most influential naval writer in history. At the geostrategic level, he argued that the key to national power and influence was "command of the sea" which he defined as "that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and fro from the enemy's shores." The key to command of the sea was the concentrated battle fleet. At the operational level, command of the sea could be achieved only by a decisive fleet action, a clash between battleships. Mahan's thought also influence the Japanese.
What were the phases of the US Navy's War Plan ORANGE for a trans-Pacific offensive? How did this plan evolve? In what way did the actual conduct of the war in the Pacific deviate from pre-war plans? What was the strategic impact of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? Did it represent a strategic miscalculation on the part of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander-in-chief of Japan's Combined Fleet? Why or why not? What impact did such prewar developments as naval aviation, amphibious operations, and submarine warfare have on the conduct of the war?
In what ways did previous history and theory prepare the United States and the US Navy for the war in the Pacific? What were Japan's goals in the Pacific? Could it have achieved those goals— through a better execution of the strategy it chose or by means of an altogether different strategy? Could a Japanese victory at sea ever have been decisive? Why or why not? Evaluate the US strategy for the Pacific. Was it sound? Why or why not? Almost all traditional military theorists and almost all contemporary doctrine-writers agree that "concentration" (or "mass") is the most important principle of war. Should the United States have divided its forces in the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives against Japan from late 1943 to late 1944? Why or why not?
Required Readings:
Edward S. Miller, "Plan Orange and the Global War" Chapter 1 of War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan. 1897-1945 (CP p. 335)

Andrew Krepinevich, "Transforming to Victory: The U.S. Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for War in the Pacific" (CP p. 345)

Edward S. Miller, "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda" (CP p. 367)

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, "Operation Plan No. 29-42," 27 May 1942, and "Letter of Instruction," 28 May 1942 (CP p. 377)

Recommended Readings:
For the Common Defense, chapters 13-14

For Further Research (Optional):
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Viking, 1990. Chapters 12-16, 29-33.

Miller, Edward S. War Plan ORANGE: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The US-Japanese Naval War 1941-45. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

Willmott, H.P. Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982.

The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Thursday, June 26

9:00 - 10:30am:
Session 12 – The American Way of War at Sea: The Evolution of an American "Maritime Strategy" (Professor Owens)
Focus:
Victory in the Pacific seemed to validate the US Navy's way of war. The aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship, but the Navy was still designed to defeat an enemy fleet. But World War II had also demonstrated the necessity for projecting power. Power projection, by means of a strike by carrier aviation or an amphibious landing joined sea control as the Navy's most important missions.
In the years after World War II, many — especially advocates of long-range air power — questioned the necessity of a large navy, especially in the absence of a significant naval adversary. But in the 1950s, under the tutelage of Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, the Soviet Union began to expand its naval power. Even so, the US Navy had to constantly defend its "strategic concept," which Samuel Huntington defined as "the fundamental element of [a] service — its role or purpose in implementing national policy." According to Huntington, a service's strategic concept answers the "ultimate question: What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?"
The Navy's answer was its "maritime strategy." Usually associated with Ronald Reagan's secretary of the navy, John Lehman, the US Navy had been refining it strategic concept since the end of World War II. How this strategic concept was to be implemented depended on the politics of defense budgets. For instance, after a period of growth during the late 1950s and 60s, the US Navy was cut sharply in the 1970s, causing it to focus on defensive sea control and "blue-water" anti-submarine warfare (ASW). But in the mid-1970s, the Navy, convinced that defensive sea control would be inadequate in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, began to develop a strategic rationale for a 600 ship force, built around 15 large deck aircraft carriers and 100 attack submarines.
What were the assumptions that underpinned the Maritime Strategy? Were they valid? How would the strategy have been executed? Who had the stronger argument" The US Navy and its advocates who argued that the Maritime Strategy was simply the naval component of an overall US military strategy, and was merely a plan to bring naval forces most efficiently to bear against the Soviet Union in the event of war? Or opponents of the Maritime Strategy who claimed that, at best, it was wasteful of resources that could be better employed for buying army forces to defeat a Warsaw Pact on NATO's Central Front; and at worst, was unnecessarily provocative because it called for US naval forces to put pressure on the Soviet strategic nuclear reserve: the ballistic missile submarines in the USSR's Arctic "bastion"?
With the end of the Cold War, the question of whether a large, "blue-water" navy is still necessary has arisen again. What is a navy that is larger than the next nine navies— most of which are allied with the United States— to do?
Required Readings:
Samuel Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy" (CP p. 391)

Mackubin Thomas Owens, "US Maritime Strategy and the Cold War" (CP p. 403)

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power (CP p. 417)

For Further Research (Optional):
Gray, Colin, The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies at War, Free Press, 1992.

Friedman, Norman. "The Maritime Strategy and the Design of the US Fleet." Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, Number 4, 1987.

Mearsheimer, John J. "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe." International Security, Vol. 11, Number 2, Fall 1986.

Friedman, Norman. The US Maritime Strategy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

Palmer, Michael A. Origins of the Maritime Strategy: The Development of American Naval Strategy, 1945-1955.

Komer, Robert W. Maritime Strategy or Coalition War. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1984.

Brooks, Linton F. "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy." International Security, Vol. 11, Number 2, Fall 1986, pp. 58-88.

10:45am - 12:15pm:
Session 13 – Air Power and the American Way of War (Professor Owens)
Focus:
Throughout American history, the U.S. Navy claimed the role of first line of defense for the nation. This role was threatened by the strategic concept of air power and the emergence of an independent U.S. Air Force during the years 1944-1947. Air power advocates, taking their cue from the Italian Guilio Douhet and his American disciple, Billy Mitchell, argued that air power, especially, strategic bombing, could achieve a decision in war independent of land and sea power. The debate over a Cold War strategic concept was vicious. In a March, 1946 speech before the Aviation Writers Association, the new Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Carl "Tooey" Spaatz enraged the U.S. Navy by asking, "why should we have a Navy at all?…There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force." Although the Korean War demonstrated the limitations of air power, President Eisenhower's "New Look" defense policy, with its emphasis on nuclear "massive retaliation" and reduced defense spending led to the dominance of the Air Force's strategic doctrine during the 1950s.
What was the essence of air power doctrine as developed by the pre-war theorists? Did Allied use of air power in World War II resemble the pre-war doctrine? How effective was air power during World War II? What did air power achieve against Germany and Japan? How has US air power theory and doctrine evolved since World War II? What are the limitations of air power as an independently decisive means of victory? Can you conceive of circumstance under which air power could win a war without the participation of land and sea power? What impact did the First Gulf War (1991) and Kosovo have on conceptions about the effectiveness of air power?
Required Readings:
David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," (CP p. 439)

Eliot Cohen, "The Mystique of US Air Power" (CP p. 451)

Benjamin Lambeth, "Bounding the Air Power Debate" (CP p. 467)

Mackubin Owens, "Kosovo and the Future of US Air Power" (CP p. 483)

Recommended Readings:
For the Common Defense, Chapters 15 and 16.

For Further Research (Optional):
Boettcher, Thomas D. First Call: The Making of the Modern U.S. Military, 1945-1953. Boston: Little, Brown, 1992.

Builder, Carl H. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Murray, Williamson. "Combined Bomber Offensive." Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, January, 1992.

Overy, R.J. The Air War 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day, 1981.

Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Chapter 14.

4:30 - 6:00pm:
Session 14 – Nuclear Weapons and the American Way of War (Professor Owens)
Focus:
Bernard Brodie, who during World War II was a naval strategist and analyst, once wrote that his reaction to the news of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was: "everything I once knew is no longer true." With the development of nuclear weapons, many US policy makers came to believe that "strategy" in the traditional sense was no longer possible. Rather than focusing on the choice of the proper means to achieve national goals, policy makers saw challenges such as Korea and Vietnam as "crises" in need of control. The goal was to prevent a crisis from spinning out of control and leading to uncontrolled escalation, possibly to central nuclear war. This led to the emergence of the academic theory of "limited war," which was developed precisely to prevent a crisis from escalating out of control. "Stability" emerged as a goal of policy and strategy goal. Indeed, one cannot understand US strategic decisions in Vietnam and elsewhere without reference to nuclear deterrence theory.
What has been America's "national style" of nuclear deterrence? What was the objective of the United States during the Cold War— to deter nuclear war or war in general? What was the impact of nuclear weapons on thinking about and planning for conventional warfare? How did Eisenhower's "New Look" envision nuclear weapons? How did Kennedy's version of "Flexible Response?" How about Reagan's version of flexible response? In what way did "peoples' wars" or "wars of national liberation" constitute a response to US nuclear strategy? Could a nuclear war ever have been "won" by either side? Why or why not? How did the development and deployment of such weapons as the extremely accurate D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile equipped with the W-88 warhead, the MX missile with the W-87 warhead, accurate nuclear-armed cruise missiles, the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (mislabeled the "neutron bomb") and a "hardened," very robust command and control system designed to function even in the event of a protracted nuclear war, affect stability. How have nuclear policy and strategy changed since the end of the Cold War? Are nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States of any value in deterring today's adversaries? Why or why not? Should there have been a "firebreak" between conventional war and the nuclear threshold?
Required Reading:
Lawrence Friedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists" (CP p. 489)

Colin Gray, "Nuclear Weapons and World Politics" (CP p. 513)

Andrew Goodpaster and John Arquilla, "Nuclear Weapons: Time to Phase them Out?" (CP p. 531)

Andrew Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak, "Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes" (CP p. 533)

Recommended Readings:
For the Common Defense, Chapter 16

Echo of Battle, Chapter 6

For Further Research (Optional):
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993)

Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971)

Friday, June 27

9:00 - 10:30am:
Session 15 – The American Way of War Post-WWII: Land Power (Professor Linn)
Focus:
The Indochina Conflict is perhaps the most controversial war the United States has ever fought. Why did the United States believe it was necessary to commit so much blood and treasure to protect the government of South Vietnam? Why was the US military unable to prevail against an opponent that was, by most indices so much weaker? Was the US Army too focused on conventional war against the Warsaw Pact to adapt to the challenges of counterinsurgency in Vietnam? Did William Westmoreland's fixation on "Big Unit" operations work against American military and political goals? Was the post-Tet shift to pacification effective? Was the Vietnam War won on the battlefield and lost at home? Why did post-Vietnam Army officers emphasize preparing for a conventional war against the Warsaw Pact? How did the Army seek to turn its vision of war into a reality? How did the collapse of the Soviet Union effect American views for land warfare? What factors may have inhibited the US Army from preparing for the military challenges of the post-Cold War world?
Required Readings:
For the Common Defense, Chapter 17

Echo of Battle, Chapter 7

For Further Research (Optional):
Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 2006)

Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977)

James H. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004)

George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 4th edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 2001)

Ronald Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1994)

10:45am - 12:15pm:
Session 16 – The American Way of War: From Vietnam to Iraq (Professor Owens)
Focus:
After the US retreat from Vietnam, America's foreign and defense policies underwent a major retrenchment. After the fall of Saigon, many military leaders, especially the leaders of the United States Army, concluded that the United States should avoid such "irregular" conflicts in the future. In the 1970s, the Army discarded what doctrine for small wars and counterinsurgency it had developed in Vietnam, choosing to focus on big wars, where its heart really lay. The Army's decision seemed to be vindicated in 1991 with Desert Storm, when a revitalized US military evicted Saddam's forces from Kuwait in short order.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid coalition victory in the Gulf, and the apparent international interdependence arising from "globalization led some argued that the age of war had finally come to an end.
Still others contended that while conflict was still possible, it would differ from war in the past. This took two forms. On the one hand were the technological optimists who believed that the United States could maintain its dominant position in the international order by exploiting the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA). On the other were the technological pessimists who rejected the idea of a technological El Dorado, a "golden city of guaranteed strategic riches."
Which group, the technological optimists or the technological pessimists, prevailed during the 1990s? Did emerging technologies provide the promised edge to the United States? Why or why not? Is part of the American way of war preparing for the conflicts we wish to fight— large-scale inter-state wars for which we possess unmatched capabilities— while ignoring the conflicts that we will have to fight, i.e. those forced on us by the asymmetric strategies of future adversaries.
Required Readings:
William Owens, "System-of-Systems: US' Emerging Dominant Battlefield Awareness Promises to Dissipate 'Fog of War'," Armed Forces Journal International, Jan 1996 (CP p. 543)

Mackubin T. Owens, "Technology, the RMA, and Future War" (CP p. 545)

Frank Hoffman, "Complex Irregular Warfare" (CP p. 557)

Mackubin T. Owens, "The Return of Counterinsurgency" (CP p. 575)

For Further Research (Optional):
Frederick Kagan, Finding The Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006)

Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004)

Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (New York: Zenith Press, 2004)

Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and the Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, 1999)

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995)

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006)

1:30 - 3:00pm:
Session 17 – The American Way of War and the Lessons of History (Professor Linn)
Focus:
The origins of military history stem from the belief among those who practice of war that the past reveals practical "lessons" that can be applied to the future. This faith in the past as prologue began with Herodotus and Thucydides and is found in all the major military thinkers, especially Clausewitz, and it has influenced virtually all writings on US military history. Indeed, much of the theoretical basis that underlies the "professional" officer is founded on history. Taken to its logical consequences, the conviction that military history guides the conduct of future wars makes the study of history a serious business. Academics may posit new interpretations of the past simply to show their cleverness, to baffle students, or to assuage their middle-class guilt.
But if the soldier misreads the lessons of the past the result is soldiers unnecessarily killed, armies defeated, and nations destroyed. What messages do soldiers seek to find in the past? How have US military personnel used the past to justify their service's objectives? Has it been to find new truths or to validate long-held prejudices? How do institutional priorities shape what officers find when they study history? What are some of the problems military thinkers encounter when they try to mine the past to see what the future will bring? Is the military's study of history an evolving process resulting in better and more accurate predictions or is it simply a recycling of old traditions?
Required Readings:
Echo of Battle, Epilogue

Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions, National Interest (22 September 1994) (CP p. 581)

Andrew Bacevich, Preserving the Well-Bred Horse, National Interest (Fall 1994) (CP p. 599)

Conrad Crane, Avoiding Vietnam (CP p. 607)

For Further Research (Optional):
John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004)

Victor David Hanson: Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power (New York: Anchor, 2002)

Williamson Murray and Richard Sinnreich, The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2002)